Second, and on a more fundamental level,[ citation needed ] the ontotheological problem is part and parcel of the overall degeneration of Western thought and the consequent troubles of Western technological culture. That positive potential, he submits, is "a species of philosophical perfectionism," only accessible once the aspects of his earlier view responsible for "his disastrous politics" have been identified and rejected 5.
Thus the question about the onto-theological character of metaphysics is sharpened to the question: How does the deity enter into philosophy?
Maintaining that Heidegger subsequently abandoned that project, Thomson infers that he learned from this mistake, as pursuit of "fundamental ontology" gives way to historical analysis of the ways in which "ontotheologies … mediate between a basic ontological 'presencing' and the guiding ontological presuppositions of the positive sciences" Reflecting the long-standing dispute about the content of Arisotle's Metaphysics, Scotus begins his commentary on the book with the question: Utrum subiectum metaphysicae sit ens inquantum ens, sicut posuit Avicenna, vel Deus et intelligentiae sicut posuit Commentator Averroes?
Its rather a complete reverse of this: metaphysics has always left unthought the identity between ontology and theology that has been implicit in it.
Moreover, the primordial historicality of Dasein affirmed in Being and Time seems plainly at odds with the pretensions of transhistoricality that Thomson attributes to fundamental ontology The book's structure facilitates the argument for this significance.
Traditionally interpreted, Platonic metaphysics is a paradigm case of ontotheology in the Heideggerian sense insofar as it explains the existence of particular beings by recourse to universal forms ontology and explains the origin and intelligibility of the whole of beings by recourse to the Good as that from which everything else emanates theology.
There is obviously a sense, exploited here by Thomson, in which the label of "ahistoricism" simply does not apply to Heidegger, at least not without further ado, given his sensitivity to the historicity of ontotheologies, not least in the contemporary world. Derrida . Its only now, at the end of a process that separates something we call "ontology" from something we call "theology" that the relationship between them comes into question at all.
It would also reinforce his contention that the later Heidegger would have refined but retained the basic structure of the Rectorial Address and that he mistakenly follows Nietzsche's strategy of combating fragmentation by rejecting academic freedom. And what of esse when it comes to mystical experience?
Within the category of reasoned theology he distinguished two further types, "natural theology" and "transcendental theology".